With the operator and flight crew in pursuit of their respective agendas unmindful of the consequences for air safety, the airline industry is virtually sitting on a time bomb
On November 12, 1996, there was a disastrous mid-air collision over Charkhi Dadri, a small village in Haryana in north India. The accident, in which several lives were lost, was a terrible blow to Indian civil aviation. Major contributory factors were the lack of transponder-equipped route radars and unidirectional corridors for arrival and departure routes. It was this disaster that compelled the Indian civil aviation industry to finally adopt corrective measures. Tragically, the authorities needed a disaster to prod them into upgrading the flying environment. Yet other problem areas with serious air safety implications exist. One such area is that of Flight Duty Time Limit (FDTL).
The current rules governing FDTL were framed in 1992 and were promulgated vide an Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC) 28/92. As these rules were outdated and were proving to be inadequate in the operating environment that has undergone a sea change, a new set of rules were promulgated vide Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) in 2007. However, soon after implementation, these were held in abeyance and currently, the old rules promulgated vide AIC 28/92 are in force with some dispensations granted by the regulatory body.
A Closer Look
To fully understand the problems related to FDTL, it is necessary to be familiar with the rules contained in two documents, namely the AIC 28/92 and the CAR issued in 2007. It is necessary for the management of airlines and flight crew to be conversant with the rules, especially when the former intends to use the latter to the maximum allowable limit.
When AIC 28/92 was issued, the only major operators were Air-India (AI) and Indian Airlines (IA). Private airlines were yet to emerge on the scene. At that point in time, work ethos in AI and IA precluded the possibility of violation of FDTL. Flying hours logged by the crew were nowhere close to the maximum permissible. With the entry of private operators, the situation changed and pilots routinely touched the maximum permissible annual limit of 1,000 hours. To achieve this figure, rostering on domestic sectors necessitated skirting of rules. A study of the salient features of AIC 28/92 would reveal the shortfalls which were and are still being regularly exploited to the benefit of operators and sometimes, individual flight crew.
The wage structure of pilots based on flying hours and flying days contributes to the subversion of FDTL rules. Most airlines pay a fixed wage for logging up to a certain number of flying hours in a month. Overtime allowance is paid by the hour for every hour beyond the mandatory minimum. Similarly, a flying duty allowance is paid for flying for a certain number of days in a month. An additional allowance is paid for each day of flying beyond the figure stipulated. Instructors flying the simulator are paid either by the hour or as lump sum over and above the flying and duty allowances.
The FINEPRINT
The existing rules on FDTL issued vide AIC 28/92 have the following inadequacies:
Stress & Strain
Flying is undoubtedly a stressful activity. Adherence to the rules on FDTL in letter and not in spirit, and exploitation of every possible loophole to the advantage of the airline or flight crew to the detriment to air safety, renders flying even more stressful. In India, the world’s most sophisticated airliners are operated in the world’s most primitive environment and with the poorest infrastructure. This further aggravates the level of stress.
Rest periods are measured by the management with a stopwatch and without regard to environmental changes. Transit time to and from airports has increased immensely. Power outages and noise pollution interfere with rest cycles. The end result is an inadequately rested pilot at the controls of an airliner laden with passengers. The operator finds loopholes in the FDTL rules to maximise output and minimise disruption of flight schedules. On the other hand, flight crew seek to exploit loopholes for financial gain. With the operator and flight crew in pursuit of their respective agendas unmindful of the consequences for air safety, the airline industry is virtually sitting on a time bomb that is already ticking.
This state of affairs was convenient to most in the first decade of operations of the private carriers. It was the first time that the Indian skies had witnessed a substantial increase in passenger airplanes. It was only after a decade of intensive operations that the long term effects of compromise with the FDTL became apparent. These were akin to the ‘burn out’ that professional sportsmen experience. The manifestations are physiological and psychological problems such as elevated blood pressure, stress, diabetes, obesity and high divorce rates.
Rules Get A Makeover
The operating environment has undergone a profound change. In 1992, when the rules were framed, most airliners carried a crew of three namely, the pilot, the co-pilot and the flight engineer. Today, no airplane has a crew of more than two. Research on sleep patterns, circadian cycle and bio-rhythms has shed new light on the importance of rest cycles. The importance of micro sleep cycles has only recently been established. Hence, the new FDTL rules in 2007 came like a breath of fresh air. Some of the features of the new rules are as under:
In short, the new rules on FDTL came as a welcome change. The basic maximum flying time limit of 1,000 hours annually has remained unchanged. The salutary aspects of the new rules were that they plugged a number of the loopholes that were being thoughtlessly and blatantly exploited. For the first time, a limit was placed on the annual duty time and the stage length of a flight vis-à-vis the number of landings was rationalised. In fact, daily flying that could be carried out by a pilot was enhanced as it was linked to the number of landings and change of time zones.
First to object to the new rules were the instructors and executive pilots as they stood to lose in some way or the other. Their time in the office and on the simulator was to be counted against the annual duty time limit of 1,600 hours. The operators were concerned as under the new rules, the number of pilots required to run their schedules did increase, though marginally. A vast majority of line pilots were extremely happy as several loopholes had been plugged.