Enhanced Safety

An indirect factor contributing to helicopter operational safety is the shortage of trained and dedicated manpower in the DGCA to oversee helicopter operations. Bureaucratic wrangles continually keep the organisation’s structure stunted and hopelessly deficient.

On May 17, 2012, a single engine helicopter operated by a Delhi-based non-scheduled operator got airborne for Delhi from Gwalior at 1340 hours with full fuel and four onboard. As strong headwinds were expected en route, prior to getting airborne, the captain spoke to the Watch Supervisor Officer (WSO) at Delhi Air Traffic Control (ATC) and requested him to accommodate the helicopter for an approach and landing from the South of Delhi, so as to reduce time in the air. The WSO did not promise but said he would try. The helicopter reached 25nm South of Delhi at 1525 hours and was asked to encircle Delhi maintaining a distance of 20 nm from the west and report 20 nm north. This meant covering an additional 60 nm and because of the prevailing wind conditions, flying an additional one hour at a cruising speeds of 90 knots.

The captain once again requested for an approach from the South, but in vain. After flying for another 45 minutes, fuel onboard was down to 100 litres. Proceeding to a point 20 nm north as instructed by ATC, would have entailed the helicopter running out of fuel before reaching Delhi. The ATC was apprised of the situation and a direct approach from the north-west was requested which too was turned down. When informed that the helicopter would be forced to carry out an emergency landing in a field, the response was that the helicopter could do so but could not be cleared to come in for a direct landing.

Eventually, the controller relented and the helicopter was permitted to report five nautical miles north at 500 feet followed by a landing at Delhi which was at 1625 hours with barely 40 litre of fuel remaining. Even discounting the unnecessary burden of extra fuel burnt to carry out ATC instructions, safety was certainly at risk during the last part of the flight. The Airports Authority of India (AAI) has issued instructions about helicopter operations in congested areas especially Mumbai and Delhi, but these are followed as exceptions rather than the rule. Meanwhile, the helicopter pilot fraternity continues to whine at the safety implications of such incidents. This is the state of affairs for places most frequently visited. Less frequented helipads have their own brand of safety problems in the context of helicopter operations.

Rotary Wing Operations

Wing Society of India, there are 293 civil helicopters flying in India, a ridiculously low figure given the geographical extent of the country, difficult terrain, its industrial base and its economic muscle. In contrast, there are several companies in the world such as Air Methods in USA and UTAir in Russia which have helicopters flying in much larger numbers. Could it be that safety concerns have contributed to the diminutive growth of helicopter flying in India?

Despite a generous share of the ‘rules’ link on the website of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) being dedicated to rotary-wing operations, accidents and incidents involving helicopters continue to occur with a distressing frequency. Some of the lessons that emerge from accidents remain to be learnt despite their repetitive nature. Helicopter operations are inherently prone to greater hazards than fixed-wing operations. Most flying is carried out at comparatively low-altitude, enhancing risk not only in terms of potential controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) situations but also because in critical emergencies such as engine failure, reaction time available is very low, possibly a few seconds. The all up weights (AUW) of helicopters are in the lower ranges and so are the corresponding payloads. Thus what the safety equipment helicopters can carry is also limited by weight considerations. Single engine helicopters bear a double jeopardy. There is no alternative source of power in case of an engine failure, unlike in a twin-engine aircraft where reduced capability to continue flight to a safe landing is a possibility in case of one engine failure. Moreover, their smaller design restricts the scope for incorporating reassuring safety features. Weather radar is not a standard fit in many helicopter types on account of weight and size limitations. Those types that do have a weather radar onboard are often deprived of their full benefit. This is because when there is bad weather ahead, the tendency is to descend so as to maintain visual contact with the ground. At lower heights, especially in hilly terrain, performance of weather radar is considerably degraded rendering helicopter operations inherently riskier than fixed-wing operations.

Air Traffic Control (ATC )

ATC procedures in India, biased in favour of IFR fixed-wing flying, are not friendly to helicopters. Thus flexibility of rotary-wing platforms cannot be fully exploited and at times, safety is seriously compromised. Even where the AAI has issued Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) supplements giving specific instructions on special routings for helicopters especially at congested airports, the ATC is disinclined to follow as it means extra work for them and is inconvenient as it entails departure from the set patterns of fixed-wing operations.

Training

Training is another weak area in India. Despite the enormous potential, there is hardly any basic rotary-wing flying training being carried out in India. One of the reasons is that fixed-wing airline jobs are prima facie more lucrative and alluring than rotary-wing. A large proportion of helicopter pilots in the civil domain come from the defence services. Some believe that because of their military background, their appetite and propensity for risk is high and hence they are unsafe. Of course, the counter to that argument is that their past experience of having flown in difficult conditions and under pressure renders them safer than pilots from civilian stream. Their decision-making under pressure is likely to be more professional and hence safer. However, the statistics of helicopters having met with fatal accidents when flying into bad weather conditions indicate that pressures from VVIP/VIPs may have overridden pilots’ judgement and forced them into taking unwarranted risks. Operational safety, as the recent ‘safety management system’ paradigm untiringly insists, is the management of risks.