Airlines - Systematically Safe

Safety management system is the most promising system of averting aviation accidents available today. However, it is neither an alternative to compliance nor a substitute for effective supervision. And it is only as good as its implementation.

If global aviation were to be handed a report card on safety it might read, “Good, but could be better.” As a matter of fact, flying has never been safer than it is today. Last year, the global accident rate was just 0.61 per million flights—among the lowest on record. On the downside, however, the rate appears to have reached a plateau during the past decade or so. Accidents continue to occur with depressing regularity. Just try explaining to the survivors of a major accident or their near and dear ones that the global accident rate is at an all-time historic low. And as the aviation industry expands, the number of flights worldwide is rising, the total number of accidents is projected to increase correspondingly. In the near future, there might even be a major accident every week. While this may not be high in purely statistical terms, the media coverage of flaming wreckage and tear-streaked faces does tend to scare potential air travellers. The fact remains that flying is still viewed as risky by the layman.

Safety Fixes

The early days of aviation until the 1970s witnessed many accidents that resulted in great loss of life. This can be called the ‘technical era’ when safety concerns were dominated by technical factors. Over the years, scores of measures were introduced to enhance safety in flying. Both in the air and on the ground major technological advances included more robust engines, anticollision devices, reliable system health indicators, precise radar control and accurate navigational aids, which brought a welcome decline in air accidents.

The early 1970s marked the beginning of the ‘human era’, and the safety spotlight switched on to the human factor. Improved training and supervision helped reduce the lapses in performance. Meticulous data collection and dissemination of details of air accidents also helped alert other operators to hazards before they could progress to fresh accidents. However, safety efforts generally tended to focus on the individual, with scant reference to the organisational framework in which persons carried out their missions.

In the early 1990s, it began to be recognised that individuals do not operate in a vacuum but within defined operational contexts. This was the start of the ‘organisational era’ when safety began to be viewed from a systemic perspective and to encompass organisational, human and technical factors.

Technological fixes can hardly be relied upon to prevent organisational and human error accidents. Then what might be done? A clue, perhaps, can be found in the widely differing accident rates of North American carriers as compared with other parts of the world. Last year, probably for the first time since air travel began, the world’s major airlines based in the developed countries did not suffer a single fatality. “In the entire first World, fatal crashes are on the brink of extinction,” says Arnold Barnett, a specialist in accident statistics. At the same time, however, Africa’s hull loss rate was 7.41, more than 12 times the global average.

The difference between airlines that still suffer from the high accident rates prevailing in the 1980s and those that achieve impressively low rates (some even zero) may lie in a major cultural difference in their approach to safety. The ‘safe’ carriers have successfully graduated from reactive to proactive safety management moving away from using safety regulations to police staff and enforce their good behaviour towards a realisation that regulations only set a minimum legal standard, and that much more can and should be done. Such organisations employ a methodical approach that covers all aspects of safety over the entire range of operations and includes everyone from the head of the organisation down to the last worker. That, in a nutshell, is what safety management system (SMS) is.

Simply SMS

SMS has much in common with modern quality assurance but lays even greater emphasis on proactive hazard identification. Although the system did not originate in aviation circles, it has been wholeheartedly embraced by key global aviation organisations such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC). The ICAO has issued the Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual (SMM), Second Edition, 2009, available for free download from its website. This manual is a comprehensive guide to all-things SMS and is an invaluable resource for all types of aviation operators everywhere.

Any experienced manager will recognise the aspects of SMS common with management theory; for instance, the need for goal setting, planning, and performance measurement. SMS also embraces parts of the organisation that may not be directly involved in day-to-day operations, but still have the potential to indirectly affect safety. SMS advocates a businesslike approach to safety—a clear, systematic and comprehensive approach to identifying hazards and controlling risks while continually ensuring that these controls remain effective. It is democracy in action because it aims to achieve a situation wherein each member of the team contributes to and is responsible for safety. It also actively encourages prompt and fearless reporting of safety concerns.

SMS recognises that human errors are not solely the result of a single person’s incompetence or negligence even though that person may ultimately be held legally responsible. Errors that cause accidents can result from a wide variety of factors, not always within the control of an individual, from the physical operating environment to interaction with others, within or outside the organisation. For instance, if a flight supervisor warns a pilot, “Get airborne by 10 a.m. or else,” is the pilot solely responsible for the resulting fast taxiing accident?

SMS accepts that errors are a normal part of any activity where humans and technology interact, and even competent personnel are not immune to mistakes. Anyone who has worked in a traditional aviation organisation may recall that accident investigations would generally focus on cause factors and mistakes committed, a key feature being to attach blame and punish ‘offenders’. Any accident often opened a can of worms, heads would roll and some changes would be made based on ‘lessons learnt’. However, it would soon be back to business as usual. SMS, on the other hand, is not preoccupied with the past or with apportioning blame, but with identifying and correcting in advance, the circumstances that can give rise to errors and omissions. It proactively looks at present risks and tries to forestall future problems. Throughout the process, the integrity of individual people remains important. SMS, perhaps most crucially, works only if it is woven into the fabric of an organisation, becoming part of its culture, rather than a mere add-on to be paid lip service to.